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1. Introduction 
As globalization and innovation have intensified the market competition among innovative 
firms, policy makers have significantly recognized the importance of R&D activities and thus 
have enacted various policies to encourage them. Among the effective policy alternatives in 
the real world, governments are continuously increasing R&D subsidization toward public 
institutions and organizations, so that public firms are key players in R&D-intensive 
industries in contemporary economies, such as healthcare, medical, energy, and 
bio-agriculture.1  
The policy consequences of R&D subsidies in mixed oligopolies, where public and private 
firms compete in R&D investments, are practical in both academic and political fields.2 As 
such, the study of the relationship between R&D activity and subsidies in mixed oligopolies 
has clear policy importance regarding current economic issues on the development of a 
national innovation system. 
Some contributors have studied cost-reducing R&D activities in the context of mixed 
oligopolies.3 Regarding subsidy policies, recent studies have analyzed their effects on R&D 
                                                  
1 Aanestad, et al. (2003) and Godø, et al. (2003) provided attentional case studies in the medical and energy 
sectors in European and OECD countries, and reported that public firms are key players in R&D-intensive 
industries. See also other interesting examples in Gil-Moltó, et al. (2011). 
2 The increasing interest of privatization policies in mixed oligopolies stems from their importance in regulatory 
reforms in the economies of developed regions, such as Western Europe, Canada, and Japan, and transitionary 
economies, such as those of China and Eastern Europe. See Bos (1986) and De Fraja and Delbono (1989) for 
early discussions, and Matsumura and Shimizu (2010) and Lee, et al. (2013) for recent developments. 
3 For example, Delbono and Denicolo (1993), Poyago-Theotoky (1998), Ishibashi and Matsumura (2006), and 
Heywood and Ye (2009) examined R&D competition in a mixed market, where patent races among firms are 
introduced. However, they did not incorporate R&D subsidies and their implications on the R&D policy.  
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activities and welfare. For instance, Zikos (2007) analyzed the policy mix of output and R&D 
subsidies in a mixed duopoly, and showed that the first-best can be obtained under full 
nationalization. Gil Molto, et al. (2011) examined an R&D subsidy, and showed that the 
subsidy leads to an increase total R&D and production, but not to an efficient distribution of 
production costs. They also found that full privatization of a public firm reduces R&D 
activities and welfare. Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013) also examined the relative welfare 
effects between R&D and output subsidies, and showed that an R&D subsidy is socially 
superior (inferior) to an output subsidy when R&D spillovers are high (low). On the other 
hand, Haruna and Goel (2015) compared two models with and without R&D under an output 
subsidy only, and found that output subsidy rankings are significantly affected by R&D 
spillovers, but the welfare ranking is not affected. 
However, not all these studies considered the partial privatization of a public firm, which is a 
popular academic and realistic policy issue in mixed oligopolies.4 In this study, we consider 
the optimal degree of privatization and compare the welfare consequences of output or R&D 
subsidies. We show that subsidy rate is always positive, irrespective of the degree of 
privatization, and that welfare is higher under output subsidy than that under R&D subsidy 
for any degree of privatization. This result is similar with Kesavayuth and Zikos’s (2013), 
who only consider full nationalization. Further, we show that the government has a higher 
                                                  
4 Since Matsumura (1998) examined partial privatization, studies on optimal privatization are increasingly 
popular and extensively used in many various contexts. For example, Ino and Matsumura (2010), Lee, et al. 
(2013) and Xu, et al. (2016) reviewed several research topics on optimal privatization. 
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incentive to privatize the public firm under the output subsidy than the R&D subsidy. This is 
consistent with the result of Gil-Moltó et al. (2011), who showed that full privatization is not 
desirable, regardless of whether the government provides R&D subsidies to private and 
public firms.  
We also consider the optimal policy mix of output and R&D subsidies, and show that the 
first-best allocation can be obtained irrespective of the degree of privatization policy. 
However, the rate of the output subsidy is constant, but the rate of the R&D subsidy is always 
negative, which is increasing in the degree of privatization. Therefore, the R&D subsidy 
should be used to discourage the over-investment when the output subsidy is already 
provided. It confirms the results of Zikos (2007) under full nationalization, but we show that 
the privatization policy does not influence welfare consequences although R&D stage is 
introduced. It is also consistent with Lee and Tomaru (2017), who introduced the approach of 
partial privatization with general demand and cost functions. We extend their analysis by 
different approaches in deriving the optimal policy mix of R&D and output subsidies. Further, 
we also explore which subsidization policy is more socially desirable and to what extent a 
public firm should be privatized when the policy mix is not available. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we present a mixed duopoly model, 
in which output and R&D competition between public and private firms occurs. In section 3, 
we consider a single subsidy policy and compare the welfare effects of output and R&D 
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subsidy policies. In section 4, we discuss on the optimal degree of privatization and 
investigate the optimal policy mix of output and R&D subsidies. Finally, we conclude our 
analysis in section 5. 
2. The Model 
Consider a duopoly market, where firms 0 and 1 produce homogeneous goods. Let the 
inverse demand function be ܲሺܳሻ ൌ ܽ െ ܳ, where ܲ is the market price, Qሺൌ ݍ଴ ൅ ݍଵሻ	 is 
the market output, and ݍ଴ and ݍଵ are the outputs of firm i, respectively. Then, consumer 
surplus is CS ൌ ܳଶ/2. 
We assume that the cost of production and R&D are, respectively, ܥሺݍ௜, ݔ௜ሻ ൌ ሺܿ െ ݔ௜ሻݍ௜ ൅
ݍ௜ଶ and ߁ሺݔ௜ሻ ൌ ݔ௜ଶ, where ܽ ൐ ܿ ൐ 0 and ݔ௜ denote the amount of R&D investment for 
firm i. The production cost shows that a firm’s R&D investment shifts its marginal cost 
function downwards, ߲ܥ/߲ݍ௜ ൌ ܿ െ ݔ௜൅2ݍ௜, but does not alter its slope.5 Note that R&D 
activity is perfectly protected against imitation.6 The firm has to spend ݔ௜ଶ to implement 
cost-reducing R&D, in which R&D investment can reduce its own cost by ݔ௜ per unit of 
output, but exhibits decreasing returns to scale. Finally, each firm receives an output or/and 
R&D subsidy, where ݏ௤ݍ௜ and ݏ௫ݔ௜ denote the per-unit subsidy to output quantity and R&D 
performance, respectively. 
                                                  
5 Following Zikos (2007), we assume a quadratic production cost function, which is standard in mixed market 
literature, for ruling out the uninteresting case of a public monopoly. 
6 We ignore R&D spillovers between the firms. However, part or all R&D results of a firm might spill over onto 
its rival in a mixed market. See Heywood and Ye (2009), Gil-Moltó, et al. (2011), Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013), 
and Haruna and Goel (2015). 
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Then, the profit function of the firm is as follows: 
ߨ௜ ൌ ሺܽ െ ݍ଴ െ ݍଵሻݍ௜ െ ሺܿ െ ݔ௜ሻݍ௜ െ ݍ௜ଶ െ ݔ௜ଶ ൅ ݏ௤ݍ௜ ൅ ݏ௫ݔ௜,											݅ ൌ 0,1, 
where ݏ௤  and ݏ௫  are, the output and R&D subsidy rates, respectively. Social welfare, 
defined as the sum of consumer surplus, firms’ profit and net subsidy, is given by 
ܹ ൌ ܥܵ ൅ ߨ଴ ൅ ߨଵ െ ݏ௤ሺݍ଴ ൅ ݍଵሻെݏ௫ሺݔ଴ ൅ ݔଵሻ. 
Note that the subsidies are financed from taxpayers in a lump-sum manner, so that they do 
not directly influence welfare.  
Firm 1 is a private firm that maximizes its own profit. On the other hand, firm 0 is a public 
firm owned by the welfare-maximizing government. We allow the government to sell its 
shares in firm 0 to profit-maximizing private investors. Let ߠ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ be the shares in firm 0 
that private investors hold. If ߠ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ, firm 0 becomes a partially privatized firm, which is 
jointly owned by the government and private investors. Following Matsumura (1998), we 
assume that firm 0 maximizes the convex combination of its profit and welfare:  
ܸ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߠሻܹ ൅ ߠߨ଴. 
The mixed duopoly model with R&D is a three-stage game. In the first stage, the government 
selects the degree of privatization and either output or R&D subsidies to maximize welfare. 
Observing the government’s decision, firms 0 and 1 independently and simultaneously 
choose their R&D investment levels in the second stage and their output levels in the third 
stage. We solve the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game by backward induction.  
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3. The Analysis 
3.1. Stage three: output choice by both firms 
In the third stage, the first-order conditions of the private firm and the public firm are as 
follows, respectively: 
߲ܸ
߲ݍ଴ ൌ ܽ െ ൫ݍ଴ ൅ ݍଵ ൯ െ ߠݍ଴ െ ሺܿ െ ݔ଴ሻ െ 2ݍ଴ ൅ ߠݏ௤ ൌ 0, 
߲ߨଵ
߲ݍଵ ൌ ܽ െ ൫ݍ଴ ൅ ݍଵ ൯ െ ݍଵ െ ሺܿ െ ݔଵሻ െ 2ݍଵ ൅ ݏ௤ ൌ 0. 
Rearranging these two equations yields the following reaction functions of the firms: 
ݍ଴ ൌ ௔ି௤భ ିሺ௖ି௫బሻାఏ௦೜ଷାఏ  and ݍଵ ൌ
௔ି௤బ ିሺ௖ି௫భሻା௦೜
ସ . 
As usual, outputs are strategic substitutes for both firms, but their magnitude depends on the 
degree of privatization and output subsidy rate. The equilibrium outputs of the third stage are: 
ݍ଴∗ ൌ ଷ௔ିସሺ௖ି௫బሻାሺ௖ି௫భሻାሺସఏିଵሻ௦೜ଵଵାସఏ  and ݍଵ∗ ൌ
ሺଶାఏሻ௔ିሺଷାఏሻሺ௖ି௫భሻାሺ௖ି௫బሻାଷ௦೜
ଵଵାସఏ . 
Then, we have the following: 
డ௤బ∗
డ௫బ ൌ
ସ
ଵଵାସఏ ൐ 	
డ௤భ∗
డ௫భ ൌ
ଷାఏ
ଵଵାସఏ ൐ 0	and	
డ௤బ∗
డ௫భ ൌ
డ௤భ∗
డ௫బ ൌ
ିଵ
ଵଵାସఏ ൏ 0. 
An increase in R&D by one firm increases the equilibrium output of the firm, but decreases 
that of the rival.  
3.2. Stage two: R&D choice by both firms 
In the second stage, the first-order conditions of public and private firms are characterized by 
the following conditions, respectively: 
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డ௤బ∗
డ௫బ ൈ
డ௏
డ௤బ ൅
డ௤భ∗
డ௫బ ൈ
డ௏
డ௤భ െ
డ஼
డ௫బ െ ቀ
డ௰
డ௫బ െ ߠݏ௫ቁ ൌ 0, 
డ௤బ∗
డ௫భ ൈ
డగభ
డ௤బ ൅
డ௤భ∗
డ௫భ ൈ
డగభ
డ௤భ െ
డ஼
డ௫భ െ ቀ
డ௰
డ௫భ െ ݏ௫ቁ ൌ 0.  
Using the envelope theorem and explicit outcomes, we have the following reaction functions, 
ݔ଴	and	ݔଵ:  
ݔ଴ ൌ
ሺ31 ൅ 16ߠ ൅ ߠଶሻሺܽ െ ܿሻ െ ሺ14 ൅ 3ߠ െ ߠଶሻݔଵ െ ሺ3 െ 35ߠ െ 16ߠଶሻݏ௤ ൅ ߠሺ11 ൅ 4ߠሻଶݏ௫
197 ൅ 157ߠ ൅ 32ߠଶ ,	
ݔଵ ൌ 4
ሺ6 ൅ 5ߠ ൅ ߠଶሻሺܽ െ ܿሻ െ 4ሺ3 ൅ ߠሻݔ଴ ൅ 12ሺ3 ൅ ߠሻݏ௤ ൅ ሺ11 ൅ 4ߠሻଶݏ௫
206 ൅ 152ߠ ൅ 28ߠଶ . 
The reaction function of each firm declines with rival’s R&D investment, but its magnitude 
depends on the degree of privatization and subsidy rates. This implies that R&D investments 
are also strategic substitutes for both firms. An increase in R&D investment by the firm leads 
to a decrease in the output by its rival firm, thereby reducing its incentives to conduct R&D. 
We have the equilibrium R&D investment of the second stage: 
ݔ଴∗ ൌ 2
ሺܽ െ ܿሻሺ275 ൅ 248ߠ ൅ 65ߠଶ ൅ 4ߠଷሻ െ 2ሺ51 െ 313ߠ െ 274ߠଶ െ 56ߠଷሻݏ௤ െ ሺ11 ൅ 4ߠሻሺ14 െ 203ߠ െ 153ߠଶ െ 28ߠଷሻݏ௫
3674 ൅ 4318ߠ ൅ 1700ߠଶ ൅ 224ߠଷ , 
ݔଵ∗ ൌ 4
ሺܽ െ ܿሻሺ3 ൅ ߠሻሺ33 ൅ 33ߠ ൅ 8ߠଶሻ ൅ 8ሺ3 ൅ ߠሻሺ27 ൅ 10ߠሻݏ௤ ൅ ሺ11 ൅ 4ߠሻሺ197 ൅ 145ߠ ൅ 28ߠଶሻݏ௫
3674 ൅ 4318ߠ ൅ 1700ߠଶ ൅ 224ߠଷ , 
Then, we also have the followings: 
߲ݔ଴
߲ݏ௤ ൌ
െ2ሺ51 െ 313ߠ െ 274ߠଶ െ 56ߠଷሻ
3674 ൅ 4318ߠ ൅ 1700ߠଶ ൅ 224ߠଷ ,
߲ݔ଴
߲ݏ௫ ൌ
െሺ11 ൅ 4ߠሻሺ14 െ 203ߠ െ 153ߠଶ െ 28ߠଷሻ
3674 ൅ 4318ߠ ൅ 1700ߠଶ ൅ 224ߠଷ , 
డ௫భ
డ௦೜ ൌ
଼ሺଷାఏሻሺଶ଻ାଵ଴ఏሻ
ଷ଺଻ସାସଷଵ଼ఏାଵ଻଴଴ఏమାଶଶସఏయ ൐ 0,  and  
డ௫భ
డ௦ೣ ൌ
ሺଵଵାସఏሻሺଵଽ଻ାଵସହఏାଶ଼ఏమሻ
ଷ଺଻ସାସଷଵ଼ఏାଵ଻଴଴ఏమାଶଶସఏయ 	൐ 0. 
This shows that the private firm’s R&D is increasing for both output and R&D subsidies, 
while the public firm’s R&D is dependent upon the degree of privatization. Particularly, if ߠ 
is sufficiently small (large), the public firm’s R&D is decreasing (increasing) for the output or 
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R&D subsidies. However, the decrease in the public firm’s R&D will be outweighed by the 
increase in the private firm’s. Therefore, total R&D, X∗ ൌ ݔ଴∗ ൅ ݔଵ∗, is increasing for both 
output and R&D subsidies. However, the effects of the output subsidy on total R&D are 
lower than those of the R&D subsidy, that is, ߲ܺ∗/߲ݏ௫ ൐ ߲ܺ∗/߲ݏ௤ ൐ 0. 
Finally, we have the following equilibrium outputs: 
ݍ଴∗ ൌ
2ሺܽ െ ܿሻሺ583 ൅ 443ߠ ൅ 84ߠଶሻ െ 2ሺ215 െ 643ߠ െ 570ߠଶ െ 112ߠଷሻݏ௤ െ ሺ11 ൅ 4ߠሻሺ23 െ 69ߠ െ 28ߠଶሻݏ௫
2ሺ1837 ൅ 2159ߠ ൅ 850ߠଶ ൅ 112ߠଷሻ ,	
ݍଵ∗ ൌ
2ሺܽ െ ܿሻሺ11 ൅ 4ߠሻሺ33 ൅ 33ߠ ൅ 8ߠଶሻ ൅ 4ሺ11 ൅ 4ߠሻሺ27 ൅ 10ߠሻݏ௤ ൅ ሺ11 ൅ 4ߠሻሺ55 ൅ 19ߠሻݏ௫
2ሺ1837 ൅ 2159ߠ ൅ 850ߠଶ ൅ 112ߠଷሻ . 
Note that both output and R&D subsidies induce the private firm to enlarge its output and 
R&D investment, but the effects on the public firm depend on the degree of privatization. 
Particularly, if ߠ  is sufficiently small (large), the public firm’s output is decreasing 
(increasing) for the output or R&D subsidies. However, the decrease in the public firm’s 
output will be outweighed by the increase in the private firm’s. Therefore, total industry 
outputs, Q∗ ൌ ݍ଴∗ ൅ ݍଵ∗, are increasing for both output and R&D subsidies. However, the 
effects of the output subsidy on total output are higher than of the R&D subsidy, that is, 
߲ܳ∗/߲ݏ௤ ൐ ߲ܳ∗/߲ݏ௫ ൐ 0. 
3.3. Stage one: subsidy choice by government 
In the first stage, the government chooses either output or R&D subsidy to maximize welfare, 
given the degree of privatization. Consequently, social welfare can be rewritten as follows: 
ܹ∗ ൌ ሺܳ
∗ሻଶ
2 ൅ ߨ଴ሺݔ଴
∗, ݔଵ∗, ݍ଴∗, ݍଵ∗ሻ ൅ ߨଵሺݔ଴∗, ݔଵ∗, ݍ଴∗, ݍଵ∗ሻ െ ݏ௤ሺݍ଴∗ ൅ ݍଵ∗ሻെݏ௫ሺݔ଴∗ ൅ ݔଵ∗ሻ. 
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From the first-order condition of ߲ܹ∗/߲ݏ௤ ൌ 0 or ߲ܹ∗/߲ݏ௫ ൌ 0, we have the following 
optimal output or R&D subsidy condition: 
ݏ௤ሺݏ௫, θሻ ൌ
ሺଶሺ௔ି௖ሻሺଶ଴ଷଶସ଻ାଷଶଵ଻଺ଽఏା଺ଷ଼ହଶ଻ఏమା଻ଶଷ଼ଵଽఏయାଷ଼ସଽ଻ସఏరାଽହଶ଼଼ఏఱା଼ଽ଺଴ఏలሻି
ሺ଼ହଵ଺ଷଵାଵସ଻଻ଵସ଻ఏାଶ଺ଶ଼ହସ଻ఏమାଶ଻଴ହଵଽ଻ఏయାଵଷହଶ଼଺ଶఏరାଷଵଽ଺଼଴ఏఱାଶ଼଼ଽ଺ఏలሻ௦ೣሻ
ሺଵହ଴଴ଵହ଴ାଶଷହ଼ହଵ଺ఏାସ଺଻଴଴ହସఏమାହଶଷଽ଼଴଴ఏయାଶ଻ହସ଼଻ଶఏరା଺଻ସଶସ଴ఏఱା଺ଶ଻ଶ଴ఏలሻ 	      (1) 
ݏ௫ሺݏ௤, θሻ ൌ
ሺଶሺ௔ି௖ሻሺ଺ହ଴ଵା଼ସଷସఏାଵଽହଽ଺ఏమାଵ଺ଶ଴ଶఏయାସଶଵଽఏరି଼଴ఏఱିଵଵଶఏలሻ
ିሺ଻଻ସଶଵାଵ଴଺ଵଷଷఏାଶ଴଴ଷ଺ହఏమାଵ଻ଷ଴଺଻ఏయା଺଴଴ହସఏరା଻ଶଶସఏఱሻ௦೜ሻ
ሺଵଵାସఏሻሺଷଵଽଵସାସ଻଴ଽହఏା଺ଷଵଽଷఏమାହଽ଺ହଷఏయାଷ଴ହଶଵఏరା଻଻଼ସఏఱା଻଼ସఏలሻ             (2) 
We now explore which subsidization policy between output or R&D subsidy is more socially 
desirable and to what extent a public firm should be privatized when a policy mix is not 
available.7 Before proceeding, we need to examine the properties of optimal solutions in (1) 
and (2). Rearranging the two optimality equations provides the following: 
ݏ௤ሺݏ௫, ߠሻ ൌ ܣ௤ െ ܤ௤ݏ௫		                                                    (1’) 
ݏ௤ ൌ ܣ௫ െ ܤ௫ݏ௫ሺݏ௤, ߠሻ		                                                    (2’) 
where ܣ௤ ൌ ଶሺ௔ି௖ሻሺଶ଴ଷଶସ଻ାଷଶଵ଻଺ଽఏା଺ଷ଼ହଶ଻ఏ
మା଻ଶଷ଼ଵଽఏయାଷ଼ସଽ଻ସఏరାଽହଶ଼଼ఏఱା଼ଽ଺଴ఏలሻ
ሺଵହ଴଴ଵହ଴ାଶଷହ଼ହଵ଺ఏାସ଺଻଴଴ହସఏమାହଶଷଽ଼଴଴ఏయାଶ଻ହସ଼଻ଶఏరା଺଻ସଶସ଴ఏఱା଺ଶ଻ଶ଴ఏలሻ ൐ 0,  
ܤ௤ ൌ ሺ଼ହଵ଺ଷଵାଵସ଻଻ଵସ଻ఏାଶ଺ଶ଼ହସ଻ఏ
మାଶ଻଴ହଵଽ଻ఏయାଵଷହଶ଼଺ଶఏరାଷଵଽ଺଼଴ఏఱାଶ଼଼ଽ଺ఏలሻሻ
ሺଵହ଴଴ଵହ଴ାଶଷହ଼ହଵ଺ఏାସ଺଻଴଴ହସఏమାହଶଷଽ଼଴଴ఏయାଶ଻ହସ଼଻ଶఏరା଺଻ସଶସ଴ఏఱା଺ଶ଻ଶ଴ఏలሻ ൐ 0, 
ܣ௫ ൌ ଶሺ௔ି௖ሻሺ଺ହ଴ଵା଼ସଷସఏାଵଽହଽ଺ఏ
మାଵ଺ଶ଴ଶఏయାସଶଵଽఏరି଼଴ఏఱିଵଵଶఏలሻ
଻଻ସଶଵାଵ଴଺ଵଷଷఏାଶ଴଴ଷ଺ହఏమାଵ଻ଷ଴଺଻ఏయା଺଴଴ହସఏరା଻ଶଶସఏఱ ൐ 0 and  
ܤ௫ ൌ ሺଵଵାସఏሻሺଷଵଽଵସାସ଻଴ଽହఏା଺ଷଵଽଷఏ
మାହଽ଺ହଷఏయାଷ଴ହଶଵఏరା଻଻଼ସఏఱା଻଼ସఏలሻ
଻଻ସଶଵାଵ଴଺ଵଷଷఏାଶ଴଴ଷ଺ହఏమାଵ଻ଷ଴଺଻ఏయା଺଴଴ହସఏరା଻ଶଶସఏఱሻ ൐ 0. 
We can show that ܣ௤ ൐ ܣ௫ ൐ 0 and ܣ௤/ܤ௤ ൐ ܣ௫/ܤ௫ ൐ 0 for ߠ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ. This implies that 
the optimal subsidies of ݏ௤ and ݏ௫ have a negative relationship, but the optimal output 
subsidy condition in (1’) is flatter than the optimal R&D subsidy condition (2’), as shown in 
Fig.1. Note that FB in Fig.1 indicates the first-best policy mix of output and R&D subsidies. 
                                                  
7 Gil-Moltó, et al. (2011) examined R&D subsidies, while Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013) investigated output 
subsidy in the presence of R&D spillovers in mixed markets. 
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Here, if the government chooses either output or R&D subsidies, the optimal subsidy rate is 
indicated by ܵܤ௤  or ܵܤ௫.  This shows that there exists under-production and 
under-investment and, thus, the government should encourage production or/and R&D 
investment by setting a positive subsidy.  
[ Fig.1. Iso-welfares under output vs. R&D subsidies ] 
Now, we solve the optimal output or R&D subsidies. Using ݏ௫ ൌ 0 or ݏ௤ ൌ 0 in the 
optimal subsidy conditions into (1) and (2), we have the following output and R&D subsidies, 
respectively: 
ݏ௤∗ሺߠሻ ൌ ݏ௤ሺ0, ߠሻ ൌ ܣ௤,	                                               (3) 
ݏ௫∗ሺߠሻ ൌ ݏ௫ሺ0, ߠሻ ൌ ܣ௫/ܤ௫.                                         ( 4 ) 
It is noteworthy that the government provides a positive R&D subsidy if there is no output 
subsidy. The importance of a positive R&D subsidy has already been shown in existing 
studies. For example, Gil-Moltó, et al. (2011) showed that a positive R&D subsidy resolves 
under-production by a private firm, even if there are R&D spillovers. In the analysis, we 
consider partial privatization and show that the optimal rate of the R&D subsidy is also 
positive, but dependent upon the degree of privatization. It implies that the effectiveness of 
the subsidy crucially depends on the degree of privatization and thus, the optimality of 
privatization should be carefully investigated when R&D stage is introduced. 
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Using the optimal output or R&D subsidies, we can show the following: 
x଴∗ሺs୶∗ሺθሻሻ ൐ xଵ∗ሺs୶∗ሺθሻሻ and q଴∗ ሺs୶∗ሺθሻሻ ൐ qଵ∗ሺs୶∗ሺθሻሻ                             (5) 
x଴∗൫s୯∗ሺθሻ൯ ൏ xଵ∗൫s୯∗ሺθሻ൯ and q଴∗ ൫s୯∗ሺθሻ൯ ൐ qଵ∗൫s୯∗ሺθሻ൯                            (6) 
xଵ∗൫s୯∗ሺθሻ൯ ൐ xଵ∗ሺs୶∗ሺθሻሻ and qଵ∗൫s୯∗ሺθሻ൯ ൐ qଵ∗ሺs୶∗ሺθሻሻ                             (7) 
x଴∗൫s୯∗ሺθሻ൯ ൏ ሺ൐ሻx଴∗ሺs୶∗ሺθሻሻ and q଴∗ ൫s୯∗ሺθሻ൯ ൏ ሺ൐ሻq଴∗ ሺs୶∗ሺθሻሻ when θ → 0ሺ1ሻ      (8) 
ܺ∗൫s୯∗ሺθሻ൯ ൐ X∗ሺs୶∗ሺθሻሻ and Q∗൫s୯∗ሺθሻ൯ ൐ Q∗ሺs୶∗ሺθሻሻ                            (9) 
First, the public firm undertakes more R&D investments and produces more outputs than the 
private firm under the R&D subsidy, as shown in (5), while it produces more outputs but 
undertakes less R&D investments than the private firm under the output subsidy, as shown in 
(6). Second, the private firm produces more outputs and undertakes more R&D investments 
under the output subsidy rather than under the R&D subsidy, as shown in (7). Third, the 
comparisons of R&D investment and output of public firm between the output subsidy and 
the R&D subsidy are ambiguous, as shown in (8). In particular, as the degree of privatization 
increases, the R&D investment and output of public firm under the output subsidy are getting 
higher than those under the R&D subsidy. Finally, total industry outputs and total industry 
investments are higher under the output subsidy, as shown in (9). Therefore, the output 
subsidy is more effective to achieve the higher outputs and higher investments. 
Regarding welfare ranks, Fig.1 also compares welfare under output and R&D subsidies. The 
13 
 
iso-welfare curve of ܵܤ௤, which goes through ݏ௤ሺ0, ߠሻ, is closer to the first-best point FB8, 
which maximizes social welfare in terms of output and R&D investment than the iso-welfare 
curve of ܵܤ௫, which goes through ݏ௫ሺ0, ߠሻ. This shows that the output subsidy yields a 
higher welfare than the R&D subsidy, regardless of the privatization degree. This is because 
the cost-saving effects under an R&D subsidy are smaller than the output-increasing effects 
under an output subsidy. This result also supports the analysis of Kesavayuth and Zikos 
(2013), who showed that an output subsidy yields a higher welfare than an R&D subsidy if 
R&D spillovers are sufficiently low. In our analysis, we obtained the same results under 
partial privatization, in that the welfare effect of the output subsidy, which enlarges total 
industry outputs, outweighs that of the R&D subsidy, which enlarges total R&D investments. 
[ Fig.2. The welfares under output vs. R&D subsidy ] 
Now, we compare welfare under output or R&D subsidies. Replacing either ݏ௤∗ሺߠሻ in (3) or 
ݏ௫∗ሺߠሻ in (4) into the welfare function provides the following welfares under the optimal 
output or R&D subsidies, respectively: 
ܹሺݏ௤∗ሺߠሻሻ ൌ ሺ௔ି௖ሻ
మሺସଶ଼ଷ଺ଵା଺଻ଷ଺଻ସఏାଵଷଷଷସଷ଺ఏమାଵସଽ଺ସଽସఏయା଻଼଺ଷଽହఏరାଵଽଶଶ଴଴ఏఱାଵ଻଼ସ଴ఏలሻ
ଵହ଴଴ଵହ଴ାଶଷହ଼ହଵ଺ఏାସ଺଻଴଴ହସఏమାହଶଷଽ଼଴଴ఏయାଶ଻ହସ଼଻ଶఏరା଺଻ସଶସ଴ఏఱା଺ଶ଻ଶ଴ఏల 		   (10) 
ܹሺݏ௫∗ሺߠሻሻ ൌ ሺ௔ି௖ሻ
మሺ଼଼଺ହାଵଷଶ଺଼ఏାଵ଻ଵଽ଴ఏమାଵ଺ସହଶఏయା଼଴଴ଽఏరାଵ଻଼ସఏఱାଵସସఏలሻ
ଷଵଽଵସାସ଻଴ଽହఏା଺ଷଵଽଷఏమାହଽ଺ହଷఏయାଷ଴ହଶଵఏరା଻଻଼ସఏఱା଻଼ସఏల               (11) 
Then, we can show that ∆W ≡ ܹሺݏ௤∗ሺߠሻሻ െܹሺݏ௫∗ሺߠሻሻ ൐ 0, for all ߠ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ.  
                                                  
8 Proposition 3 provides the definition of the first-best, which maximizes social welfare in terms of output and 
R&D investment. 
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Proposition 1. Given the degree of privatization, social welfare is higher under the output 
subsidy than under the R&D subsidy. 
Without considering partial privatization, Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013) showed that the 
welfare effect of output and R&D subsidies crucially depends on the degree of R&D 
spillovers. Specifically, if the degree of R&D spillovers is sufficiently small, welfare is 
higher under an output subsidy than an R&D subsidy. In the absence of R&D spillovers, 
Proposition 1 further shows that an output subsidy always yields higher welfare than the 
R&D subsidy, regardless of the privatization degree, as shown in Fig.2. This is because cost 
savings under an R&D subsidy are not much larger and, thus, cannot offset the distortions 
associated with under-production. Therefore, the output subsidy is more effective in 
removing significant distortions due to under-production, which provides higher welfare. 
4. Discussions 
4.1. Optimal privatization policy 
We have shown that the output subsidy yields higher welfare than the R&D subsidy 
regardless of the degree of privatization. Now, it is important for the government to adjust the 
optimal degree of privatization to enhance welfare. Then, the first-order conditions for 
maximizing social welfare in (10) or (11) yield the optimal degree of privatization, i.e., 
ߠ௤ ≅ 0.367 under the output subsidy, and ߠ௫ ≅ 0.175 under the R&D subsidy.  
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Proposition 2. Partial privatization is the optimal policy, but the optimal degree of 
privatization is greater under the output subsidy than under the R&D subsidy. 
Proposition 2 shows that partial privatization is the optimal policy, regardless of whether the 
government sets the optimal output or R&D subsidies. It also shows that the government has 
a greater incentive to privatize public firms under the output subsidy than under the R&D 
subsidy. (See Fig.2.) 
The economic explanations are as follows. Consider the nationalization case, where the 
public firm maximizes welfare rather than its own profit. Under the output subsidy, the public 
firm produces more output and invests less in R&D than the private firm, as shown in (5). 
The higher privatization has the effect of redistributing output from the higher-marginal-cost 
public firm to the lower-marginal-cost private firm. The resulting increase in the private 
firm’s output lowers total industry costs, which induces the distribution of production costs 
across the firms to be more efficient. Further, due to the output substitution effect, the private 
firm enjoys an increase in its market share, which encourages it to engage in more 
cost-reducing R&D to earn higher profits. Again, the lower industry costs tend to increase 
total industry outputs. Therefore, non-nationalization is effective for obtaining higher welfare 
under the output subsidy. However, for a high degree of privatization, although it can remove 
cost inefficiency, under-production distortion is serious. Consequently, partial privatization is 
optimal under the output subsidy. 
16 
 
On the other hand, under the R&D subsidy, the nationalized public firm also produces more 
output and invests more in R&D than the private firm, as shown in (6). As such, a higher 
privatization will induce the private firm to enlarge its R&D investment and, thus, reduce its 
marginal cost. The resulting decrease in the public firm’s output works toward lowering total 
industry costs, which induces the distribution of production costs across the firms to be more 
efficient. The lower industry costs also increase total industry outputs. Therefore, 
non-nationalization is also effective in obtaining higher welfare under the R&D subsidy. 
However, at the same degree of privatization under the output subsidy, the distortion of 
under-production will be more serious without an output subsidy, as shown in (9). As a result, 
partial privatization is optimal under the R&D subsidy and it should be lower than that under 
the output subsidy. 
4.2. Optimal subsidization policy mix 
When the government chooses the optimal policy mix of output and R&D subsidies, we will 
examine the optimal degree of privatization. Solving the first-order conditions of output and 
R&D subsidies in (1) and (2) together provides the optimal policy mix of output subsidy, 
s୯୊ ൌ ଶሺୟିୡሻ଻ , and R&D subsidy, s୶୊ሺθሻ ൌ െ
ଶሺୟିୡሻ
଻ሺଵଵାସ஘ሻ.  
Proposition 3. The optimal policy mix of output subsidy, ݏ௤ி ൌ 2ሺܽ െ ܿሻ/7, and R&D 
subsidy, ݏ௫ிሺߠሻ ൌ െ2ሺܽ െ ܿሻ/7ሺ11 ൅ 4ߠሻ, can achieve the first-best (FB) outcome, which 
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maximizes social welfare in terms of output and R&D investment, (ݍ௙, ݔ௙ሻ	, at the subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium. 
[Proof] First, we can define the first-best, which maximizes social welfare in terms of output 
and R&D investment, (ݍ௙, ݔ௙ሻ	, from the first-order conditions: డௐడ௤ ൌ 0 and 
డௐ
డ௫ ൌ 0. Then, 
the first-best outcome is ݍ௙ ൌ 2ሺܽ െ ܿሻ/7	and ݔ௙ ൌ ሺܽ െ ܿሻ/7, which is described as FB in 
Fig. 1. It is also satisfies the second-order conditions. Then, it is easy to show that the optimal 
policy mix of output subsidy can attain this first-best outcome.  Q.E.D. 
Note that the first-best outcome requires the principles of marginal cost pricing and cost 
minimization, i.e., ܲሺܳ௙ሻ ൌ ܥ௤ሺݍ௙, ݔ௙ሻ and െܥ௫ሺݍ௙, ݔ௙ሻ ൌ ߁௫. We can elicit several salient 
implications from this proposition. First, the positive rate of the output subsidy will induce 
firms with market power to produce more outputs. This is because oligopolistic firms produce 
less outputs than under perfect competition. Therefore, the positive output subsidy remedies 
the deviation from the market price of the firm’s marginal revenue, ܲ െܯܴ௜ ൌ െܲᇱݍ௜ ൐ 0, 
to make the firms behave in a perfectly competitive way.9  
Second, the negative rate of the R&D subsidy is in fact R&D tax, which will remove the 
distortion of cost inefficiency due to firm over-investment, which is caused by the output 
subsidy.10 The output subsidy encourages firms to overinvest because greater investments 
                                                  
9 In a private market, Lee (1999) compared the efficiency of output subsidy between blockaded and free entry 
equilibrium, while Lee (1998) discussed the efficiency of R&D subsidy on the regulated firm under asymmetric 
information. 
10 Learhy and Neary (1997) provided the economic rationale on the negative R&D subsidy in a private market, 
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lead to higher production and, thus, higher market shares. Furthermore, the optimal rate of the 
R&D subsidy depends on the privatization degree. Particularly, the R&D tax rate is 
increasing in the degree of privatization, that is, ߲ݏ௫∗/߲ߠ ൐ 0 , as a higher degree of 
privatization makes the public firm produce less for a given R&D profile, which enlarges 
private firm’s outputs due to strategic substitution. Thus, the government should increase the 
R&D tax rate to make private firms lose their incentives to conduct R&D investment.  
Third, the first-best outcomes can be achieved irrespective of the degree of privatization. 
For example, under the optimal policy mix, Zikos (2007) showed that the first-best can be 
achieved in a mixed duopoly under full nationalization (ߠ ൌ 0), while Lee and Tomaru (2017) 
showed that the first-best can be achieved in a mixed oligopoly under full privatization 
(ߠ ൌ 1). Therefore, our results confirm results in previous literature, but we show that the 
first-best can be achieved for any degree of privatization if the government uses the optimal 
policy mix of output and R&D subsidies. In fact, there are four different decisions of market 
failure because public and private firms have heterogeneous objectives: allocative 
inefficiencies from under-production and cost inefficiencies in the allocation of production 
costs across public and private firms. However, if the government sets full nationalization 
(ߠ ൌ 0), as assumed in Zikos (2007), the public firm will maximize welfare, which is the 
objective of the government, and thus, the government controls decisions on both the output 
                                                                                                                                                           
while Gil-Moltó, et al. (2011) showed that the rate of the R&D subsidy in a mixed market will be positive in the 
absence of the output subsidy. 
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and R&D investment of the public firm. Therefore, the policy mix of two subsidies can work 
to remedy the four market failures. Additionally, if the government sets full privatization 
(ߠ ൌ 1), as an example in Lee and Tomatu (2017), there exists symmetric equilibrium of 
outputs and R&D investments for both private firms, which have homogeneous objective 
functions. Thus, the policy mix of output and R&D subsidies can also achieve a first-best. In 
the case of partial privatization, where 0 ൏ ߠ ൏ 1, we can also show that three policy 
instruments are sufficient to treat these market failures, as long as the R&D subsidy adjusts 
the degree of privatization. 
Fourth, our results show that the positive rate of output subsidy is independent of the 
degree of privatization. Without considering R&D investments in the model, it supports the 
well-known Privatization Neutrality Theorem (PNT) in literature on mixed markets. PNT 
states that, in the absence of R&D investment choices, the same output subsidy rate yields the 
first-best before and after privatization.11 We show that the first-best outputs are chosen 
under the positive rate of output subsidy, ݏ௤∗, irrespective of whether the public firm is 
privatized under the first-best R&D investment. 
Fifth, the PNT does not hold once the R&D setting stage is introduced. That is, the PNT 
fails because the optimal rate of R&D subsidy is dependent of the degree of privatization and, 
                                                  
11 PNT states that privatization does not affect welfare, regardless of time structure, competition mode, the 
number of firms, product differentiation, and the degree of privatization under the optimal output subsidy. This 
has been continuously discussed by White (1996), Pal and White (1998), Poyago-Theotoky (2001), Hashimzade, 
et al. (2007) and Matsumura and Okumura (2013). However, Matsumura and Tomaru (2013, 2015) showed that 
PNT failed under the existence of either foreign competitors or an excess burden of taxation. 
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thus, the first-best is affected by the degree of privatization. Some previous studies have 
already presented the failure of the PNT by showing that subsidies cannot achieve the 
first-best (see footnote 11). In contrast, we found that, while the first-best allocation is 
achievable, the degree of privatization does not influence the optimal rate of the output 
subsidy, but influences that of the R&D subsidy.  
Finally, we can reevaluate the optimal degree of privatization when other economic or 
political conflicts are taken into consideration. Particularly, when the government must 
minimize payments for subsidies due to strict budget constraints or excess burden of taxation, 
for instance, full nationalization (i.e., ߠ ൌ 0) would be desirable. Recall that the optimal rate 
of the output subsidy is a constant, while that of the R&D subsidy is increasing with the 
degree of privatization. Therefore, payment for total subsidies, 2ݏ௤ிݍ௙ ൅ 2ݏ௫ிሺߠሻݔ௙ , is 
minimized under full nationalization (ߠ ൌ 0ሻ. This result is in sharp contrast with the results 
of previous studies on R&D investment in a mixed market. For example, Heywood and Ye 
(2009) considered the same model, wherein a partially privatized firm and a private firm 
compete in quantity and R&D in the absence of subsidies, and showed that the optimal policy 
is partial privatization. Gil-Moltó, et al. (2011) showed that full privatization is not desirable, 
regardless of whether the government provides R&D subsidies to private and public firms.  
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5. Conclusion 
The study of R&D activities and government’s subsidies in mixed oligopolies has a 
significant relevance in current economic issues on the innovation system. Incorporating the 
partial privatization approach, we investigated the welfare consequences of output and R&D 
subsidies, and showed that welfare is higher under the output subsidy than under the R&D 
subsidy, regardless of the degree of privatization. Further, partial privatization is the optimal 
policy in both output and R&D subsidies, but the government has a higher incentive to 
privatize the public firm under the output subsidy than under the R&D subsidy. Finally, we 
showed that the optimal policy mix of output and R&D subsidies can attain the first-best 
allocation, but the degree of privatization does not influence the optimal rate of output 
subsidy, but influences that of R&D subsidy. 
There remains future research. The simplified model with Cournot duopolistic competition 
with homogenous products should be further examined. The endogenous market structure, 
such as Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg, under a differentiated products market is also a 
promising topic for future research.12 Further, positive externalities such as strong R&D 
spillover effects or output network effects might change the results on the welfare 
consequences between output and R&D subsidies. Finally, uncertainty is one of elements in 
                                                  
12 In the endogenous timing game under mixed duopoly without considering R&D investments, Matsumura and 
Ogawa (2012) showed that price competition is an equilibrium while Scrimitore (2013) showed that quantity 
competition is an equilibrium under output subsidization. Tomaru, et al. (2011) considered strategic delegation 
game and analyzed the effect of privatization on the firm’s delegation type. 
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designing R&D strategies in complex environments, which has been extensively examined in 
the R&D literature.13 Thus, high standard expertise is needed for the decisions on the 
different R&D programs, which implies that the owners (both government and the private 
investors) as the laymen may be not able to choose optimal R&D strategies. As a result, the 
owner might simply evaluate the efficiency of R&D performances as an R&D policy target14 
or devise managerial incentive schemes. These topics are challenging issues for future 
research. 
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